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11 Introduction
In recent years, a substantial empirical literature on global income inequality has emerged.1
There is considerable controversy in this literature concerning the evolution of global in-
equality, with some studies claiming that global inequality has risen over the past few
decades and others claiming that it has declined. Since any empirical statement on global
inequality rests on both arduous data collection and an inherently normative measure-
ment framework, the reasons for the disagreement can be manifold.
It is well-known that a genuine assessment of global inequality would need micro
data on a global scale. In the absence of comparable worldwide income surveys spanning
a su¢ ciently long time period, most authors have fallen back on various techniques to
reconstruct yearly global income distributions. As extensively discussed in the survey
by Anand and Segal (2008), at least part of the divergence in conclusions across studies
is the result of di⁄erent methodological choices in this construction of global income
distributions. However, as far as the measurement apparatus used to assess inequality
is concerned, there seems to be a remarkable tacit agreement to focus exclusively on the
relative view of inequality, thereby ignoring the a priori equally relevant absolute and
intermediate views. Formally, the relative view says that inequality remains invariant
if all incomes change by the same proportionate amount, while the absolute view says
that inequality remains invariant if all incomes change by the same absolute amount.2
When assessing inequality changes against the background of substantial income growth
over several decades, as is the case with global inequality, it would be surprising that the
speci￿c choice of invariance concept would not have a major impact on the conclusions
reached.
Figure 1 illustrates how the choice for absolute or relative invariance may indeed
lead to radically di⁄erent perspectives on the same data. The ￿gure presents the yearly
growth in GDP per capita (corrected by PPP factors) between 1980 and 2009 for ￿ve
quintiles of the 1980 income distribution taking population sizes into account. The left
1See, for instance, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), CapØau and Decoster (2005), Chotikapanich,
Valenzuela and Rao (1997), Dowrick and Akmal (2005), Milanovic (2002, 2005), Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-
Martin (2009) and Sala-i-Martin (2006).
2The relative invariance requirement is sometimes interpreted as an innocent technical property to
make inequality comparisons independent of the unit in which incomes are measured. But, as several au-
thors have emphasized, this interpretation is problematic (e.g., Kolm, 1976a, pp. 419-420, and Marchant,
2008, pp. 694-695). Invariance requirements deal with the normative issue of how to distribute amounts
of various sizes in an inequality-neutral way and hence they re￿ ect an important aspect of the notion of
inequality which extends beyond the independence of the unit of measurement. In our empirical applica-






















































































Figure 1: Growth between 1980 and 2009 in PPP-GDP per capita in percentage and in
absolute numbers per quintile of the 1980 income distribution (Data: World Bank, 2010)
axis shows the average yearly growth in percentage terms. Obviously, the staggering
yearly growth of the bottom quintile, being the fourfold of the growth rates in the upper
half of the 1980 distribution, has narrowed the relative gaps between the bottom quintile
and the rest of the distribution. The right axis shows the yearly growth of GDP per
capita in absolute terms. The comparison between the bottom and the top quintiles is
now radically di⁄erent. Income per capita in the top quintile rose by more than $431
per year (or 1.59%), while that of the bottom quintile only increased by $192 per year
(or 8.78%). This means that the absolute income gap between the bottom and the top
quintile has widened. It is clear that conclusions about global income inequality will
heavily depend on the particular invariance view adopted.
As also remarked by Ravallion (2003) and Atkinson and Brandolini (2004, 2010), the
exclusive focus on the relative view in the study of global income inequality is unwar-
ranted. Already at the beginning of the modern literature on inequality measurement,
the various rival invariance views were discussed in seminal contributions by Kolm (1969,
1976a, 1976b). Several concepts of intermediate inequality, each with absolute and rela-
tive inequality as polar cases, have since then been proposed￿ see the comparative studies
by Ebert (2004), Zheng (2004) and Zoli (2003) and the references therein. The prevailing
appreciation in the theoretical literature is that one cannot argue conclusively in favor of
one speci￿c invariance view using only positive arguments. The choice between invari-
3ance views is a matter open to normative disagreement.3 Therefore, a complete account
of global inequality requires that all alternative invariance views are considered.
In this paper we analyze the evolution of global income inequality by considering
absolute and intermediate views in addition to the relative view. We will use the following
generic concept of intermediate inequality: inequality remains constant if a rise in total
income consists for ￿% in an equal proportionate increase and for (1 ￿ ￿)% in an equal
absolute increase. The number ￿ is allowed to vary with the initial distribution and the
size of the increase in total income. We show that this generic concept is fully consistent
with many of the alternative intermediate concepts that have been developed in the
theoretical literature￿ e.g., with those proposed by Besley and Preston (1988), Bossert
and P￿ngsten (1990), del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (2000), Krtscha (1994), P￿ngsten (1987)
and Yoshida (2005). We interpret the parameter ￿ as a measure of relativeness, which
quanti￿es the particular position of an intermediate view between the polar absolute
(￿ = 0) and relative (￿ = 1) cases.
We apply this more comprehensive framework to the assessment of global inequality
using two perspectives. First, we consider an ￿-intermediate version of the Lorenz domi-
nance criterion. This allows us to determine the ranges of ￿ values for which conclusions
hold unanimously for all inequality measures with the corresponding intermediate views.
Second, because inequality measures with a common intermediate view do not always
unanimously agree,4 we also consider ￿-intermediate versions of the S-Gini and gener-
alized entropy classes of inequality measures. We identify the parameter combinations
(with one parameter, ￿, measuring the degree of relativeness and the other parameter
measuring the degree of bottom-sensitivity) that correspond to the competing judgments
on the evolution of global inequality through time. The main contribution of this paper
is to provide robust results holding for large classes of inequality measures and to make
explicit the dependence of the conclusions on the degree of relativeness. Our analysis is
therefore complementary to that of Atkinson and Brandolini (2004, 2010), who focus on
particular measures of inequality.
Our empirical analysis uses World Bank (2010) data on population and GDP per
capita (in 2005 dollars, corrected using PPPs) for 115 countries in the period 1980-
2009. We make abstraction from within-country inequality. The between-country income
distribution consists of the total number of individuals of the 115 countries, with each
3That people do, in fact, disagree on invariance views has been amply demonstrated using question-
naires. See, e.g., Amiel and Cowell (1999a, 1999b) and Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993).
4For instance, although several popular relative inequality measures (such as the Gini and Theil
indices) show that global inequality has decreased over time, there are relative inequality measures
giving more weight to the top or the bottom of the income distribution that indicate an increase in
global inequality (see CapØau and Decoster, 2005).
4individual assigned the GDP per capita of his or her country as income (see the appendix
for more details on the data). There are two reasons to focus exclusively on the between-
country component. First, few data are available for within-country distributions on
a global scale. Several studies have constructed within-country distributions based on
many debatable assumptions, making it di¢ cult to choose objectively among them (see
Anand and Segal, 2008). Second, the between-country income distribution constitutes
a solid benchmark case. Not only do many of these studies agree that the between-
country component is the most important component of global income inequality, they
also seem to agree on the direction of change of between-country inequality: the relative
inequality measures often used in empirical work, such as the Gini and Theil indices,
indicate a decline of between-country inequality. It is therefore interesting to see what
di⁄erence a move to absolute and intermediate measures makes in the particular context
of between-country inequality.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline the generic concept of in-
termediate inequality used in our analysis and we discuss the links with various existing
concepts of intermediate inequality. In Section 3, we consider absolute, intermediate
and relative Lorenz dominance comparisons for each pair of income distributions in the
sample. Since we have income distributions for each year between 1980 and 2009, there
are 435 such pairwise comparisons. For each comparison, we will report the range of
values of ￿ for which Lorenz dominance holds. Finally, in Section 4, we consider the
same extension of ￿-intermediateness for two classes of inequality measures: the S-Gini
and the generalized entropy classes of measures. This allows us to obtain further insights
for those cases where there is no ￿-Lorenz dominance. Section 5 concludes.
2 Absolute, relative and intermediate views
An income distribution is a vector x = (x1;x2;:::;xn) of positive real numbers with xi the
income of individual i = 1;2;:::;n. Incomes are ordered such that x1 ￿ x2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ xn.
The set X collects all income distributions. The arithmetic mean of x is denoted by ￿ x
and we write ￿n for the n-dimensional vector of which each component is equal to the
real number ￿.
An inequality measure is a continuous function I : X ! R which satis￿es the transfer
principle. This principle says that, with total income ￿xed, a richer-to-poorer transfer
decreases inequality. Formally, for each (x1;:::;xi;:::;xj;:::;xn) in X and each pos-
itive real number ￿, if xi < xi + ￿ ￿ xj ￿ ￿ < xj, then I(x1;:::;xi;:::;xj;:::;xn) >
I(x1;:::;xi + ￿;:::;xj ￿ ￿;:::;xn).
An invariance view expresses how a change in total income has to be distributed over
5Table 1: Intermediate views as weighted averages of the relative and absolute views
Given distribution x = (100;200;300;400), how should an extra amount 4 ￿ 250 (= 4 ￿ ￿) be divided
(resulting in distribution x
0) such that inequality is una⁄ected?
Inequality view ￿ x
0 ￿BP ￿P ￿Y
Absolute 0 (350;450;550;650) 1 0 0
Intermediate 0:10 (335;445;555;665) 2250 0.00044 0.138
Intermediate 0:20 (320;440;560;680) 1000 0.00100 0.263
Intermediate 0:50 (275;425;575;725) 250 0.00398 0.585
Intermediate 0:80 (230;410;590;770) 62.5 0.01575 0.848
Intermediate 0:90 (215;405;595;785) 27.7 0.03475 0.926
Relative 1 (200;400;600;800) 0 1 1
the individuals such that inequality remains invariant. Suppose distribution x0 di⁄ers
from distribution x by an extra amount of income n￿, or ￿ x0 = ￿ x + ￿. According to the
relative invariance view, income distribution [(￿ x + ￿)=￿ x]x shows the same inequality as
income distribution x, i.e., inequality remains the same if all incomes are multiplied by
the same factor ￿ x0=￿ x. According to the absolute invariance view, income distribution
x + ￿n shows the same inequality as income distribution x, i.e., inequality remains the
same if all incomes are increased by the same amount ￿. We consider intermediate views
that are weighted averages of the relative and absolute views. That is, according to an
intermediate inequality view, for every distribution x and for every amount of per capita
growth ￿, there is an ￿ between 0 and 1 such that distribution x0, de￿ned as
x0 = ￿
￿ x + ￿
￿ x
x + (1 ￿ ￿)(x + ￿n), (1)
is equally unequal as distribution x. The cases ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 correspond to the
absolute and relative views, respectively. Intermediate views may be closer or further to
each of these extremes in varying degrees. Because ￿ in equation (1) depends on x and
on ￿, we consider ￿ as a local measure of the degree of relativeness.
Table 1 gives an example. The initial distribution is x = (100;200;300;400). A per
capita increase in income of ￿ = 250 amounts to a doubling of average income from
￿ x = 250 to ￿ x0 = 500. The ￿rst row of the table corresponds to the absolute view, where
all individuals receive the same absolute increase in income of 250, whereas the last row
corresponds to the relative view, where all incomes are doubled. The rows in between
show the distributions x0 corresponding to values of ￿ between 0 and 1.
Most concepts of intermediate inequality suggested in the literature use the weighted
average form of equation (1) and, hence, are covered by our general approach. The
di⁄erence between the various concepts of intermediate inequality lies in how ￿ varies
6with the mean of x and with the size of ￿. For the concept of P￿ngsten (1987), ￿ equals
￿P ￿ x=(￿P ￿ x+1￿￿P) with ￿P a constant between 0 and 1.5 For that of Besley and Preston
(1988), ￿ equals ￿ x=(￿ x + ￿BP) with ￿BP a constant greater than 0.6 For the concept of
del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (2000), ￿ is a constant.7 Finally, for that of Yoshida (2005),
￿ equals [( ￿ x+￿
￿ x )￿Y ￿ 1]=( ￿ x+￿
￿ x ￿ 1) with ￿Y a constant between 0 and 1.8 The choice
of the speci￿c parameter value, ￿P;￿BP or ￿Y , determines an ￿ for every x and every
￿. Moreover, ￿ is a strictly monotonic function of ￿P;￿BP and ￿Y . In other words,
￿ is a natural way of measuring relativeness for each of these concepts of intermediate
inequality. In the three rightmost columns of Table 1 we give the parameter values for
the various concepts that correspond to the given values of ￿.
3 ￿-Lorenz dominance
The chosen invariance view only determines iso-inequality loci of distributions with di⁄er-
ent total incomes. To broaden the scope of inequality comparisons, we now combine the
invariance requirement with the transfer principle, as embodied in the Lorenz dominance
criterion.






yi for all k = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1,
with at least one inequality holding strictly.9 Above, we have de￿ned an inequality
measure as satisfying the transfer principle. It is well-known that x Lorenz dominates y
if and only if all inequality measures agree that x is strictly less unequal than y.
Now suppose that the income distributions x and y do not have equal means. Then
we need a prior step to equalize the means and it is here that the particular invariance
view comes into play. Suppose ￿ x < ￿ y. We then look for an income distribution x￿ that
is equally unequal as x but has a mean equal to that of y. Suppose that ￿ is the local
5This concept is further explored by Bossert and P￿ngsten (1990).
6This concept is based on that of Kolm (1976b).
7We present here a variant of the concept of del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (2000). This variant is a special
case of the concept proposed by Seidl and P￿ngsten (1997) which was in turn inspired by Ballano and
Ruiz-Castillo (1993). The very broad concept of Seidl and P￿ngsten (1997) does not in general ￿t into
the framework presented here.
8Yoshida (2005) generalizes Krtscha (1994). In the latter concept ￿Y equals 0:5.
9The Lorenz dominance criterion is de￿ned here for the ￿xed population case. For our empirical
analysis we extend this de￿nition, as is common, using the replication invariance principle. This principle
says that inequality remains the same if the income distribution is replicated any number of times. Note
that the inequality measures considered in Section 4 satisfy replication invariance by de￿nition.




x + (1 ￿ ￿)(x + (￿ y ￿ ￿ x)n). (2)
By construction x￿ and y have equal means and hence can be compared using Lorenz
dominance. This procedure leads to the following concept of ￿-Lorenz dominance.
De￿nition 1. Let x and y be two income distributions such that x ￿ y. Let x￿ be
de￿ned as in equation (2). We say that x ￿-Lorenz dominates y if x￿ Lorenz dominates
y. We say that y ￿-Lorenz dominates x if y Lorenz dominates x￿.10
Note that ￿-Lorenz dominance of x over y is equivalent to agreement of all inequality
measures with a local relativeness of ￿￿ i.e., all measures according to which x is equally
unequal as x￿￿ that x is less unequal than y. Furthermore, 1-Lorenz dominance and 0-
Lorenz dominance correspond to relative and absolute Lorenz dominance, respectively.11
Stronger judgments may however be deduced from the fact that x ￿-Lorenz dominates
y, depending on whether x or y has the higher mean. Consider again the example of Table
1 with x = (100;200;300;400). Let y = (220;450;580;750), a distribution with twice the
total income of x. Note that x0:5 = (275;425;575;725) Lorenz dominates y, and hence
that x 0.5-Lorenz dominates y. One easily checks in Table 1 that we also have ￿-Lorenz
dominance of x over y for all values of ￿ smaller than 0:50; that means that all inequality
measures with a local relativeness of 0 (absolute) up to 0.50 will agree that inequality
has increased in the transition from x to y. On the other hand, note that y 0.9-Lorenz
dominates x since y = (220;450;580;750) Lorenz dominates x0:9 = (215;405;595;785).
Once again, one easily checks that y also ￿-Lorenz dominates x for all ￿ greater than
0.90. Hence, all inequality measures with a local relativeness of 0.90 or more would agree
that inequality has decreased in the transition from x to y. Note that neither x0:8 Lorenz
dominates y, nor y Lorenz dominates x0:8.12 See del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (2000, pp.
232-233) for a related discussion.
The logic of the numerical example can be generalized to the following result.
10As we saw in Section 2, the ￿-intermediate view is consistent with many of the invariance con-
cepts proposed in the theoretical literature. By consequence, ￿-Lorenz dominance is also consistent with
Lorenz dominance criteria based on those invariance concepts. Consider as an example the case of P￿n-
gsten￿ s (1987) concept of inequality invariance: by substituting ￿ = ￿￿ x=(￿￿ x + 1 ￿ ￿) in the expression
Pk
i=1 ￿(￿ yxi=￿ x) + (1 ￿ ￿)(xi + ￿ y ￿ ￿ x) ￿
Pk
i=1 yi, we obtain the condition of P￿ngsten￿ s (1986) Lorenz
dominance criterion, viz.,
Pk
i=1(xi ￿ ￿ x)=(￿￿ x + 1 ￿ ￿) ￿
Pk
i=1(yi ￿ ￿ y)=(￿￿ y + 1 ￿ ￿).
11See Moyes (1987) for a comparison of relative and absolute Lorenz dominance. This paper introduced
the absolute Lorenz dominance criterion into the literature.
12To be more precise, it can be shown that x ￿-Lorenz dominates y for every ￿ in the interval [0;0:514]
and that y ￿-Lorenz dominates x for every ￿ in the interval [0:867;1]. For other values of ￿, the
distributions x and y are not Lorenz comparable.
8Proposition 1. Let x and y be two income distributions such that x ￿ y. If x ^ ￿-Lorenz
dominates y, then x ￿-Lorenz dominates y for all ￿ < ^ ￿. If y ~ ￿-Lorenz dominates x,
then y ￿-Lorenz dominates x for all ￿ > ~ ￿.
Proof. We only prove the case where x ^ ￿-Lorenz dominates y since the proof of the other
case is very similar. Let x ^ ￿-Lorenz dominate y. Let ￿ < ^ ￿. We need to show that if








￿ xxi +(1￿ ^ ￿)(xi + ￿ y ￿ ￿ x)
for all k = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1. We rewrite the requirement as (^ ￿ ￿ ￿)
Pk
i=1(xi + ￿ y ￿ ￿ x) ￿




￿ xxi. Letting ￿ y = (1 + ￿)￿ x, this becomes
Pk
i=1(xi + ￿￿ x) ￿
Pk
i=1(xi + ￿xi).
We get ￿k￿ x ￿ ￿
Pk
i=1 xi for all k = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1, which is indeed true since ￿ > 0. 2
We tested ￿-Lorenz dominance for all 435 possible pairwise comparisons of the world
income distribution for the years between 1980 and 2009. In view of Proposition 1, we
need only present, for every pair of world income distributions x and y with x ￿ y, the
maximal ^ ￿ for which x ￿-Lorenz dominates y and the minimal ~ ￿ for which y ￿-Lorenz
dominates x. We start with the former, given in Table 2. For expositional convenience,
the table presents the years in order of increasing average income. Not surprisingly,
average world GDP per capita increased in almost every year between 1980 and 2009.
The only two exceptions are 1982 (decrease of 1.2%) and 2009 (decrease of 1.5%).13
Each cell of Table 2 gives the maximal ^ ￿ for which the row year ￿-Lorenz dominates
the column year. This means that the distribution obtained by ^ ￿-rescaling the row year
distribution upwards, Lorenz dominates the column year distribution.14 The ￿-Lorenz
ordering being a partial ordering, we report ￿ -￿if there is no value of ￿ such that the row
year ￿-Lorenz dominates the column year.
To interpret Table 2, we ￿rst focus on a typical case where average income increased
through time. Consider the change in the world income distribution between 1980 and
2005. We have ^ ￿ = 0:46, which means that 1980 ￿-Lorenz dominates 2005 for ￿ equal
to 0:46 and, using Proposition 1, also for all values of ￿ between 0 and 0:46. That is,
all inequality measures with a local relativeness between 0 (absolute) and 0:46 agree
that inequality has increased between 1980 and 2005. Of the 435 possible comparisons,
there exists a critical ^ ￿ in 215 cases. For these 215 dominance cases, the median value
of ^ ￿ equals 0.48 and the mean value equals 0.46. Only two out of these 215 critical ^ ￿
13Although average income increased between 1982 and 1983 (from $5,944 to $5,990), it was still lower
in 1983 than in 1981 (when it was $6,015). Only in 1984 the income level ($6,156) again exceeded the
level of 1981. Hence, for the years 1981 to 1983, we have ￿ x1982 < ￿ x1983 < ￿ x1980 < ￿ x1981 < ￿ x1984: For the
recession of 2009, we have ￿ x2006 < ￿ x2009 < ￿ x2007 < ￿ x2008.
14We compared the Lorenz-ordinates at each point of the union of abscissa points de￿ned by the corners



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10values involve a comparison which runs back in time (viz., the comparison of 2009 with
respectively 2007 and 2008). Therefore, we conclude that Table 2 gives considerable
support for the claim that world inequality has increased through time for the absolute
view, and also for invariance views which move substantially in the direction of the
relative view.
Comparisons involving the year 2009 deserve a special mention. First, the comparison
of the world income distribution of 2009 with that of 2008 (where 2008 has the higher
average income) yields a critical ^ ￿ = 0:98. This means that the statement that inequality
has decreased between 2008 and the recession year 2009 is very robust. The pattern of￿
for many countries, negative￿ growth rates in 2009 must have been such that, roughly
speaking, both the absolute gaps narrowed and the ratios shrunk. Second, it is remarkable
that the column labeled ￿ 2009￿contains only one number, viz., for the row ￿ 1981￿ . This
means that, with the exception of 1981, we cannot claim that previous years were more
equal than 2009, not even if we take the absolute view.
The results of Table 2 present non-negligible evidence for the claim that inequality
has increased over the last thirty years if one takes a su¢ ciently absolute view. This
conclusion is not incompatible with a claim that inequality has decreased provided one
takes a su¢ ciently relative view. Therefore, we also computed the minimal ~ ￿ values
such that a column year (in Table 2) ￿-Lorenz dominates a row year. However, we
do not present the table with ~ ￿ values. The reason is simple: for none of the 435
bilateral comparisons we found an ￿-Lorenz dominance of a year with a higher mean
income over a year with a lower mean income. By consequence￿ with the few exceptions
of decreasing income through time￿ we can safely conclude that one cannot claim that
global inequality decreased through time for all inequality measures with a given minimal
level of relativeness. Even if we restrict attention to the relative measures alone, we
cannot make the statement that between-country inequality unambiguously decreased
for all these measures. This means that the common ￿nding in the literature that relative
between-country inequality has decreased through time is dependent on the particular
subset of relative inequality measures used. In the next section we have a closer look at
the conclusions for speci￿c inequality measures.
4 Inequality measures
If the ￿-Lorenz dominance criterion fails to yield a conclusion, this means that at least
some inequality measures do not agree on the direction of the inequality change. In this
case it is interesting to consider speci￿c inequality measures separately in order to obtain
further insights. We consider two classes of inequality measures: the S-Gini class and
11the generalized entropy class. We ￿rst de￿ne the relative cases of the two classes and
then consider extensions that also include absolute and intermediate measures.
The ￿rst class we consider is that of the S-Gini inequality measures (Donaldson and
Weymark, 1980, 1983). Recall that i is the rank position of individual i in the income
distributions (since incomes are ordered such that x1 ￿ x2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ xn). For the relative
case, we have














, ￿ ￿ 1. (3)
Second, we consider the class of generalized entropy inequality measures (Bourguignon,
1979, Cowell, 1980, Cowell and Kuga, 1981a, 1981b, Shorrocks, 1980, 1984). For the
relative case, we have
GE￿(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
































for ￿ = 1.
(4)
The parameter ￿ in the S-Gini class and the parameter ￿ in the generalized entropy class
both measure the degree of bottom-sensitivity. The higher the value of ￿, or the lower
the value of ￿, the more weight is given to transfers at the bottom of the distribution
relative to transfers at the top.15 Some familiar inequality measures are obtained for
speci￿c values of the parameters. Setting ￿ = 2 in the S-Gini class gives the Gini index.
For the generalized entropy class, setting ￿ < 1 gives measures which are ordinally
equivalent to the class of measures proposed by Atkinson (1970), setting ￿ = 0 gives the
mean logarithmic deviation and setting ￿ = 1 gives the Theil inequality measure.
The two classes given in equations (3) and (4) are relative. We use the same approach
as in the previous section with Lorenz dominance to allow for all degrees of relativeness
between 0 and 1.
De￿nition 2. Let x and y be two income distributions such that x ￿ y. Let x￿ be
de￿ned as in equation (2). We say that x is at least as unequal as y according to the
(￿;￿)-S-Gini inequality measure if SG￿(x￿) ￿ SG￿(y). We say that y is at least as
unequal as x according to the (￿;￿)-S-Gini inequality measure if SG￿(y) ￿ SG￿(x￿).
It is tempting to extend the class of generalized entropy measures in equation (4)
analogously. This would read as follows.
15With ￿ su¢ ciently high or ￿ su¢ ciently low, the focus is on the smallest income as a fraction of the
mean. With ￿ su¢ ciently high, the focus is on the highest income as a fraction of the mean.
12De￿nition 3. Let x and y be two income distributions such that x ￿ y. Let x￿ be
de￿ned as in equation (2). We say that x is at least as unequal as y according to the
(￿;￿)-generalized entropy inequality measure if GE￿(x￿) ￿ GE￿(y). We say that y is
at least as unequal as x according to the (￿;￿)-generalized entropy inequality measure
if GE￿(y) ￿ GE￿(x￿).
However, contrary to the criterion in De￿nition 2, the criterion in De￿nition 3 is not
transitive.16 For example, consider the measure with parameter values ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1
and the income distributions x = (10;30;50), y = (14;22;54), x0 = x + (10;10;10) =
(20;40;60) and y0 = y + (10;10;10) = (24;32;64). Since the (0;1)-generalized entropy
measure is absolute, distributions x and x0 are equally unequal and the same goes for
distributions y and y0. Because distributions x and y have equal means, De￿nition
3 demands we follow the judgment of the relative generalized entropy measure with
￿ = 1. The same is true for the distributions x0 and y0. We have GE1(x) > GE1(y) and
GE1(x0) < GE1(y0), and hence x is more unequal than y and x0 is less unequal than y0.
We obtain the following cycle: x0 is equally unequal as x, x is more unequal than y, y is
equally unequal as y0 and y0 is more unequal than x0. Although with our focus on isolated
pairwise comparisons in the empirical application, this lack of transitivity is not really
a problem, we still prefer to work with a transitive extension of the generalized entropy
class of inequality measures. We therefore use the method of Bossert and P￿ngsten
(1990) to extend the relative class in equation (4).
De￿nition 4. Let x and y be two income distributions such that x ￿ y. We say
that x is at least as unequal as y according to the Bossert-P￿ngsten (￿;￿)-generalized
entropy inequality measure if GE￿(x + [(1 ￿ ￿)=￿]n) ￿ GE￿(y + [(1 ￿ ￿)=￿]n) with
￿ = ￿￿ x=(￿￿ x + 1 ￿ ￿). We say that y is at least as unequal as x according to the
Bossert-P￿ngsten (￿;￿)-generalized entropy inequality measure if GE￿(y+[(1￿￿)=￿]n) ￿
GE￿(x + [(1 ￿ ￿)=￿]n) with ￿ = ￿￿ x=(￿￿ x + 1 ￿ ￿).17
Figures 2 and 3 summarize the empirical results. Each bilateral comparison between
two selected years is represented by a demarcation curve in the two-parameter space of
respectively (￿;￿) for the S-Gini class and (￿;￿) for the generalized entropy class. The
curve depicts the parameter combinations for which inequality between the two years
16In fact, the criterion in De￿nition 2 is equivalent to the Bossert and P￿ngsten (1990, p. 132) extension
of the Gini indices. That is, for all income distributions x and y, we have that x is at least as unequal as
y according to the (￿;￿)-S-Gini inequality measure if and only if ￿ xSG￿(x)=(￿￿ x+1￿￿) ￿ ￿ ySG￿(y)=(￿￿ y+
1 ￿ ￿), with ￿ = ￿￿ x=(￿￿ x + 1 ￿ ￿) if ￿ x ￿ ￿ y and ￿ = ￿￿ y=(￿￿ y + 1 ￿ ￿) if ￿ x ￿ ￿ y.
17Cowell (2006) discusses how the absolute case is obtained by taking the limit (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ ! 1.
This absolute subclass has also been characterized axiomatically￿ see Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda

































Figure 2: Increasing and decreasing inequality in the (￿;￿) normative space according
to the S-Gini index (Data: World Bank, 2010)
remains unchanged. For the parameter combinations to the left of these iso-inequality
lines inequality has increased over time, while for the combinations to the right it has
decreased. Since the ￿gures would become illegible if we present all bilateral comparisons,
we made a selection for some relevant subperiods.
Figure 2 reveals that the members of the S-Gini class unanimously agree that in-
equality has increased between 1980 and 2009 for values of ￿ up to 0:532. This means
that one has to stick to a local relativeness of at least 0:532 if one wants to conclude that
inequality decreased over the thirty year period between 1980 and 2009. The greater
the focus on the more bottom-sensitive members of the class (corresponding to higher
values of ￿), the less one has to go in the direction of the absolute view to conclude
that inequality has increased. S-Ginis measures with su¢ ciently high values of ￿ even
agree that inequality has increased irrespective of the level of local relativeness ￿. If
we shorten the period of comparison (always comparing with the ￿nal year 2009), the
pattern remains the same: an increase in ￿ pushes the minimal ￿ for which we conclude
that inequality increased upwards.
Figure 3 shows that the generalized entropy inequality measures agree on increased
inequality between 1980 and 2009 for values of ￿ up to 0:492. This minimal value of
￿ occurs at a bottom-sensitivity of ￿ = ￿3, but for other values of ￿ one can a⁄ord to
take a less absolute view and still conclude that global inequality has increased. Similar



























Figure 3: Increasing and decreasing inequality in the (￿;￿) normative space according
to the Bossert and P￿ngsten GE-index (Data: World Bank, 2010)
show increased inequality if either ￿ is su¢ ciently low or su¢ ciently high. With the
exception of the 2005-2009 comparison, this pattern also emerges for the shorter periods
of comparison.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we applied absolute, relative and intermediate concepts of inequality to the
assessment of the evolution of global inequality. We used World Bank (2010) data on
population and GDP per capita for 115 countries in the period 1980-2009.
Based on our tests for ￿-Lorenz dominance, we found overwhelming support for the
claim that inequality has increased over time. For many of the pairwise comparisons￿
213 out of 435 cases￿ the income distribution of the earlier year Lorenz dominates that
of the later year for the absolute case. That is, all absolute measures indicate an increase
in inequality over time for these comparisons. Moreover, we showed that one can usually
move substantially in the direction of the relative view without losing the unanimous
verdict of increased inequality. Strikingly, the reverse test￿ whether the year with the
larger income dominated the year with the lower income for some minimal level of ￿￿
did not yield any result. This means that we did not ￿nd robust evidence for decreased
inequality over the last three decades, neither for the absolute view, nor for the relative
view, nor for any view intermediate between the two polar cases.
15We considered absolute, intermediate and relative versions of the generalized entropy
class and of the S-Gini class and determined the combinations of the two parameters (lo-
cal relativeness and bottom-sensitivity) underlying a judgment on the evolution of global
inequality. Several popular relative members of these classes indicate that inequality has
decreased over time. However, we showed that one does not need to rely on genuine
absolute measures to reverse the conclusion. For the changes in the world income distri-
bution over the period 1980-2009, some intermediate level of relativeness (with a value
of ￿ around 0.5) su¢ ces to produce unanimous agreement on increased inequality within
the corresponding subset of inequality measures.
The purpose of this paper was not to provide a single de￿nite answer to the dispute
whether world inequality has decreased or increased. On the contrary, we precisely
stressed that in a context of income growth an unavoidable normative choice concerns
the invariance concept that one adopts. We have shown that the speci￿c choice of
invariance concept does indeed have a major impact on the answer one gives to the
simple question of whether world inequality increased or not. Increasing absolute gaps
may only be a temporary phenomenon if the divergence of growth rates between poor
and rich countries remains su¢ ciently large in the future. This does not, however, in any
way diminish the usefulness of revealing normative and methodological choices which
can explain apparently opposite scholarly conclusions.
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18Appendix. Countries in the data set
The World Development Indicators (2010) contain data for 212 countries. Only countries
for which we have data in all periods are included in our analysis, which reduces the data
set to 115 countries. Table 3 gives an overview. This reduced data set contains 86.39%
of the 2009 population. The ten most populated absentees from our data set are the
Russian Federation, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Ukraine, Tanzania, Poland, Uganda,
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Table 3: Countries in the data set
Albania Dominican Republic Korea, Rep. Romania
Algeria Ecuador Latvia Rwanda
Antigua and Barbuda Egypt, Arab Rep. Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Argentina El Salvador Liberia Senegal
Australia Estonia Luxembourg Seychelles
Austria Fiji Madagascar Sierra Leone
Bangladesh Finland Malawi Singapore
Belgium France Malaysia South Africa
Benin Gabon Mali Spain
Bolivia Gambia, The Mauritania Sri Lanka
Botswana Germany Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis
Brazil Ghana Mexico St. Lucia
Bulgaria Greece Morocco St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Burkina Faso Grenada Mozambique Sudan
Burundi Guatemala Namibia Swaziland
Cameroon Honduras Nepal Sweden
Canada Hungary Netherlands Syrian Arab Republic
Central African Republic Iceland New Zealand Thailand
Chad India Nicaragua Togo
Chile Indonesia Niger Trinidad and Tobago
China Iran, Islamic Rep. Nigeria Tunisia
Colombia Ireland Norway Turkey
Comoros Israel Pakistan United Kingdom
Congo, Dem. Rep. Italy Panama United States
Congo, Rep. Jamaica Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Costa Rica Japan Paraguay Vanuatu
C￿te d￿ Ivoire Jordan Peru Venezuela, RB
Denmark Kenya Philippines Zambia
Dominica Kiribati Portugal
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